The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) affected the U.S. federal mandatory minimum sentencing laws for to crack cocaine offenders, and represented the first Congressional reform of sentencing laws in over 20 years. A primary goal of this legislation was to lessen the harshness of sentences for crack cocaine offenders and decrease the sentencing gap between crack defendants and powder cocaine defendants. While both the mean sentence length for crack offenders fell following the implementation of the FSA, these changes appear to primarily reflect the continuation of on-going sentencing trends that were initiated by a variety of nonCongressional reforms to federal sentencing policy that commenced around 2007. However, the FSA appears to have been helpful in allowing these trends to continue past 2010.
I. Introduction
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 implemented mandatory minimum sentences upon conviction for trafficking in quantities of drugs exceeding specific quantity thresholds for each drug. While crack cocaine is produced from powder cocaine, and therefore is pharmacologically identical in its active ingredient, the mandatory minimum triggering quantities prescribed under the law were extremely different for the two drugs, with the ratio of powder cocaine relative to crack cocaine needed to trigger eligibility for a mandatory minimum being 100:1.
The reasons Congress initially cited for justifying the differential treatment of crack cocaine relative to powder cocaine under the mandatory minimum legislation were eventually revealed to have little merit. Moreover, the disparate treatment of crack cocaine relative to powder cocaine also became viewed as racially biased, as over 80 percent of those convicted for crack have generally been African-American, while less than 33 percent of those convicted for other drugs such as powder cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana have been AfricanAmerican (Vagins and McCurdy, 2006) .
In response to this controversy, there developed strong bi-partisan support to lessen the disparate treatment of crack relative to powder cocaine under the mandatory minimums, which eventually led to the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA). The primary policy change inherent in the actual FSA legislation was that the mandatory minimum triggering quantities for crack cocaine were increased roughly five-fold while holding the mandatory minimum triggering quantities for other drugs (including powder cocaine) constant. Thus, following the implementation of the FSA, the ratio of powder cocaine relative to crack cocaine needed to trigger eligibility for a mandatory minimum dropped from 100:1 to about 20:1.
Many U.S. legislators and ideological disparate groups including the Open Society Policy
Center, the American Humanist Association, and the National Association of Evangelicals heralded the FSA as a major policy change that will increase the fairness of U.S. sentencing policy. Such praise might at first glance appear to be warranted, as the mean sentence for crack defendants fell by 17 months, or almost 16 percent, in the two years just after the passage of the FSA relative to the two years just before. However, the evidence presented in this paper suggests this simple observation presents a somewhat misleading picture the FSA's impact sentencing.
In particular, this paper argues that the FSA should not be viewed as a mechanism by which the US Congress pushed the US district courts into reducing sentencing for crack offenders (and thereby lessening the crack/powder cocaine sentencing gap), but rather as a Congressional assist to a variety of other reforms to the United States federal sentencing guidelines that have allowed federal judges and prosecutors to act on their preferences for shorter sentences for crack offenders. More specifically, the United States' Supreme Court's decisions in the Booker case and subsequent Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough cases which made the United States sentencing guidelines advisory rather than mandatory by 2007, and the United States Sentencing Commission's implementation of the Crack Amendment of 2007 which altered the U.S.
sentencing guidelines for crack offenders, initiated a trend toward more leniency in sentencing of crack offenders. The subsequent adjustments to mandatory minimum triggering quantities as directed by the FSA, in conjunction with further reforms to the United States Sentencing Guidelines for crack offenders that occurred concurrently, allowed this evolution toward more lenient sentencing norms for crack offenders to continue. Therefore, in assessing whether the impact of the FSA should be considered a major policy reform, the answer appears somewhat nuanced. While the reforms to mandatory minimums inherent in the FSA appear to have done little in and of themselves to accelerate downward trends in sentencing of crack offenders and the crack/powder cocaine sentencing gap, the implementation of the FSA likely helped preclude the mandatory minimums from substantially impeding the continuance of the pre-FSA trends toward greater leniency.
II. Background on the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
Crack cocaine first started to be manufactured and used in the early 1980s as an alternative to freebasing cocaine, or heating powder cocaine and inhaling the vapors. Crack cocaine use expanded quickly, particularly in low income predominantly African-American neighborhoods (Chitwood et al. 1996) . With the crack trade expanding, violence and cocainerelated deaths increased (Kerr 1986; Klein et al. 1991; Grogger and Willis 2000; Fryer et al. 2013 ) to the point where it was being termed an epidemic.
The issue of drug addiction and the proliferation of crack became prominent enough such that by the mid-1980s Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. The major policy aspect of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act was mandated minimum sentences triggered by strict quantity thresholds that differed by drug. Table 1a shows the different mandatory minimums and their triggering quantities associated with different drugs and different criminal histories as dictated by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. As can be seen, there are two triggering quantity thresholds for each drug, where the higher one corresponds to a higher mandatory minimum (unless the defendant has been convicted for two previous drug felonies and there was bodily injury associated with the current conviction). Notably, these mandatory minimum triggering quantities were far lower for crack cocaine than for all other major drugs. Possibly most controversially, the ratios between the mandatory minimum triggering quantities for powder cocaine relative to crack cocaine were 100:1.
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This disparate treatment of crack cocaine relative to powder cocaine was increasingly criticized as being racially biased, as crack cocaine defendants were far more likely to be black than white. Indeed, in the year 2000, the United States Sentencing Commission reported that over eighty percent of federal crack cocaine offenders were black, a rate far above the analogue for other drugs (U.S.S.C. 2002).
At the urging of several civil rights groups including the American Civil Liberties Union and the Sentencing Project, by the early 2000s both the United States Sentencing Commission and a bi-partisan coalition of congressmen voiced support for decreasing or even eliminating the differential treatment of crack cocaine relative to powder cocaine. Even with such support any such legislation faced opposition and numerous hurdles. The Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) was eventually introduced as a comprise plan, and signed into law August 3, 2010. The primary policy reform associated with the act was to change the mandatory minimum triggering quantities for crack cocaine. In particular, while the FSA did not fully eradicate the disparate treatment of crack cocaine relative to powder cocaine, it decreased the 100:1 ratio of mandatory minimum triggering quantities to a roughly 20:1 ratio. Table 1b shows the key details associated with the FSA legislation. For crack cocaine offenders, the lower mandatory minimum triggering quantity rose from 0.005 kilograms to 0.028 kilograms, and the upper mandatory minimum triggering quantity rose from 0.05 kilograms to 0.28 kilograms. The FSA did not alter the mandatory minimum triggering quantities for other drugs.
Up to and after the implementation of the FSA, individuals and groups from across the political spectrum hailed the act as a substantial policy reform aimed to mitigate the crack cocaine/powder cocaine sentencing disparity, and in conjunction lessen the racial disparity of the federal justice system. For example, on the political left, Patrick Leahy, a Democratic United States Senator, said "(a)fter more than 20 years, the Senate has finally acted on legislation to correct the crack-powder disparity and the harm to public confidence in our justice system it created." Similarly, Roy Speckhardt, executive director of the American Humanist Association, said "(t)his corrects a historical injustice within our legal system," and Nkechi Taifa, a senior policy analyst at the Open Society Policy Center, stated "(t)his victory in drug sentencing reform is extraordinary; advocates have been fighting for nearly two decades to eliminate the egregious disparity between crack and powder cocaine. We have significantly 'cracked the disparity' with unprecedented bipartisan support and will continue the critical work to achieve a fair and just criminal justice system." These sentiments are not only relegated to the political left. For example, Galen Carey, director of government affairs at the National Association of Evangelicals, remarked "(t)he legislation makes significant progress toward parity in criminal penalties for possession and use of crack and powder cocaine."
As will be seen in more detail below, however, in evaluating the impact of the FSA, it is important not to view the FSA in isolation, but rather in the broader context of a variety of sentencing reforms not specifically related to mandatory minimums that were occurring concurrently and even well before the implementation of the FSA. Importantly, while the FSA itself only affected the quantity cutoff thresholds for mandatory minimums for crack cocaine, the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) responded to the FSA in November 2010 by altering the entire sentencing guideline structure for crack cocaine to make it consistent with the new mandatory minimum cutoffs. To put it another way, while the FSA itself only affected sentencing for crack offenders convicted for quantities between 0.005 kilograms and 0.028 kilograms (who now faced no mandatory minimum) and crack offenders convicted for quantities between 0.05 kilograms and 0.28 kilograms (who now faced a lower mandatory minimum), the changes to the sentencing guidelines ostensibly applied to all crack offenders.
Moreover, the whole of the USSC sentencing guidelines underwent some quite radical changes a few years prior to passage of the FSA. The guidelines are determined not by Congress, but rather by the United States Sentencing Commission, and map each quantity of each drug into an "offense severity" score, which in conjunction with a criminal history score, map into a cell in a sentencing grid that is associated with a relatively narrow sentence range. Initially, the USSC guidelines were mandatory, but in a series of United States Supreme Court decisions starting with the Booker decision of 2005, and maybe most notably the Kimbrough decision in late 2007, substantially weakened the role for the guidelines. In particular, the Kimbrough decision held that a judge could depart from the guidelines if he/she disagreed with the policy choices underlying the guideline sentence---most notably the disparate treatment of crack cocaine relative to powder cocaine. In other words, the guidelines changed from being mandatory to advisory. Moreover, also in late 2007, the USSC lowered the "offense severity" score for all crack cocaine offenders in the sentencing guidelines, effectively lessening the recommended guideline sentence for all crack offenders (this change to the guidelines is often referred to as the 2007 Crack Amendment). As I discuss in more detail below, these changes in the structure and force of the USSC guidelines appear to have had large implications on sentencing, particularly for crack offenders.
To my knowledge, there have been no formal analyses of the impact of the FSA on sentence lengths for crack defendants or on the sentencing gap between crack cocaine defendants and powder cocaine defendants. However, there is a diverse literature looking at mandatory minimum sentencing laws more broadly. For example, LaCasse and Payne (1999), Bjerk (2005) , Ulmer, Kurlychek, and Kramer (2007) , and Rehavi and Starr (2013) look at how mandatory minimums impact pre-trial bargaining. Helland and Tabarrok (2007) , Shepard (2002), Marvell and Moody (2001) , and Loftin, McDowall, and Weirsema (1992) examine the extent to which mandatory minimums may affect the behavior of potential criminals. Loftin, Heumann, and McDowall (1983) look at both of these issues with respect to a state mandatory minimum law for gun crimes. Somewhat relatedly, Fischman and Schanzenbach (2012) argue that mandatory minimums may have played a role in increasing racial disparities in sentencing following the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions that declared the Sentencing Guidelines to be advisory rather than mandatory.
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Studies that focus explicitly on mandatory minimums for drug crimes are fewer, but still encompass a wide spectrum of analyses. For example, Caulkins et al. (1997) conduct a cost/benefit analysis of the mandatory minimums for cocaine, Kautt and Spohn (2002) look at whether defendants of different races or genders are more or less subject to federal drug mandatory minimum sentences, and Hartley, Maddan, and Spohn (2007) look at how prosecutors apply "substantial assistance" to circumvent guidelines and mandatory minimums for crack and powder cocaine cases.
Some of the most comprehensive work looking at federal mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes has been done by the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC 2011). Using federal sentencing data from the 2010 fiscal year (a subset of the data used in the analysis below), the USSC finds that mandatory minimum eligible federal drug defendants appear to receive sentences consistent with the mandated minimums less than half of the time, primarily due to the federal "safety-valve" statute which allows defendants meeting certain criteria (notably a minimal criminal history) to avoid a mandatory minimum. The U.S.S.C. report also finds that eligible black defendants are more likely to receive a sentence consistent with the mandated sentence than white or Hispanic defendants. While the U.S.S.C. study suggests that part of the reason black defendants were more likely than defendants of other races to receive a sentence consistent with the mandatory minimum might be because they were more likely to have substantial criminal records making them ineligible for safety valve relief, they did not explicitly analyze this issue.
III. Methodology
The goal of the first part of this paper is the estimate the direct impact of the FSA legislation on the expected sentence length for crack offenders. The "naïve" approach would be to just compare the expected sentence for crack offenders sentenced after the FSA took effect to those sentenced prior to the FSA (i.e., 2010 and earlier), or if we let δ represent the impact of the However, there are a couple of key issues that will cause the naïve approach mentioned above to potentially dramatically overstate δ, or overstate the direct impact of the FSA. First, there might be other trends impacting changes in expected sentence for crack offenders beyond the FSA. For example, one might be concerned that the characteristics of crack defendants are changing over time (most notably their criminal histories and/or their conviction quantities), and these compositional changes amongst crack defendants are impacting average sentence lengths for crack. Similarly, there may be other policies and reforms (such as those highlighted in the previous section) that may have been affecting sentences for crack offenders over time. Given the possibility of such other trends, E[S crack | post-FSA] -E[S crack | pre-FSA] will be a biased estimate of δ, or in other words not capture just the impact of the FSA, as it will conflate the impact of the FSA with these other trends. Therefore, to assess the impact of the FSA, not only do we have to control for any changes in crack defendant characteristics over time, but also, rather than evaluate whether there was a change in expected sentences for crack offenders following the implementation of the FSA, we need to evaluate whether there was a change in the trend in the expected sentencing for crack offenders following the implementation of the FSA.
To control for changes in crack defendant characteristics and test for a break in the sentencing trend for crack offenders following the FSA, I estimate a regression of the following form for all crack defendants:
(1)
where S i, corresponds to the sentence given to a defendant i, t is a linear monthly time trend, and postFSA i is a dummy variable equal to one if the defendant was sentenced after the FSA became effective. To account for any changes in defendant characteristics over time, the vector X i includes race and gender dummies, criminal history dummies, and quantity category dummies (corresponding to the cells in USSC sentencing grid severity scores), while D is a vector of district fixed-effects to control for the possibility that more lenient districts may have received a larger or smaller fraction of crack cases over time. The final term, ε i , is the residual error term.
There is a second reason why the naïve approach discussed at the outset of this section might be a biased assessment of the FSA. Namely, as alluded to in the previous section, the changes to crack mandatory minimums inherent in the FSA were not the only changes to sentencing policy in the fall of 2010, as just after the implementation of the FSA, the USSC also altered the guidelines for all crack offenders to make them consistent with the revised mandatory minimum cutoffs specified by the FSA. This means that to the extent expected sentences for crack offenders did fall following the implementation of the FSA (at least relative to pre-FSA trends), some of this might not be due to the FSA changes to mandatory minimums, but rather due to the changes in the sentencing guidelines.
To consider this issue, I examine the degree to which expected sentences for crack offenders fell for those whose sentences should have been directly impacted by the reforms to mandatory minimums inherent in the FSA relative to those whose sentences should not have been impacted by the reforms to the mandatory minimums (but may well have been impacted by the changes to the sentencing guidelines). In particular, as discussed above, the FSA only 
IV. Description of the Data
The data used for this paper come from the annual Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences datasets. The primary analyses that follow are based on the 2009 through 2012 versions (though later I also look at data from versions going all the way back to 2002). These data are collected and organized by the United States Sentencing Commission, and contain information on all cases sentenced under the federal court system. These data sets contain a wealth of defendant information, including conviction charge---and for drug convictions, conviction drug type and quantity---as well as adjudication district, and demographic and criminal history category for each defendant. Moreover, sentencing information is provided.
From this data, I extract only cases where the defendant was charged with only one type of drug, where that drug is crack cocaine, powder cocaine, or methamphetamine. I also limit the sample to only those with valid data on drug amount and sentence length, and exclude cases in non-U.S. districts (e.g. Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands). Table 2 shows basic pre-FSA summary statistics by drug (i.e., for defendants convicted in the years 2009 and 2010). As can be seen, crack defendants on average received substantially longer sentences when compared to those convicted for powder cocaine. Table 2 also shows that while over 80 percent of crack defendants are black, less than 30 percent of defendants convicted for powder cocaine are black. Finally, as can be seen in the last row of Table 2 , a much higher fraction of crack defendants had previous felony convictions than those defendants convicted for other drugs. Hence, as has been highlighted before, the sentencing of crack defendants is an issue that by and large is something that primarily impacts black Americans and repeat offenders.
V. Evaluating the Impact of the Fair Sentencing Act on Average Sentence Lengths for
Crack Defendants Figure 1 shows a naïve assessment of the impact of the FSA by simply looking at how the mean sentence for crack defendants changed between the twenty four months prior to the FSA and the twenty four months following the implementation of the FSA. As can be seen, the mean sentence fell by 17 months, or about 16 percent.
However, as discussed above, this simple pre-to post-FSA difference in mean sentence length for crack defendants (with relatively large time blocks on either side of the passage of the FSA) may be a problematic assessment of the direct effect of the FSA on sentence lengths for crack defendants. The top line in Figure 2 shows the time trend in mean sentence length for crack Figure 5 ). As can be seen quite clearly, the mean sentence for crack defendants was already falling well prior to the implementation of the FSA, and at least at this aggregated level, there does not appear to be any obvious change or jump in the trend following the implementation of the FSA.
As a point of comparison, Figure 2 also shows the trends in the sentencing for powder cocaine offenders which should not have been directly affected by the FSA. As can be seen, the mean sentence length for cocaine offenders fell a small amount following the implementation of the FSA. This at least suggests that there were no countervailing sentencing policy changes that were pushing up sentences for drug crimes as a whole during the time the FSA was implemented. Interestingly, the trend in mean cocaine sentences was actually quite flat prior to the implementation of the FSA, but started a downward trend right around the implementation of the FSA. Therefore, one thing this picture makes clear is that even though cocaine sentences should not have been impacted by the FSA, it would not be appropriate to do a difference-indifference estimate using the trends in cocaine sentencing as the "missing counterfactual" trend, since the parallel pre-treatment trends requirement for such a procedure is clearly not met (the same is true for methamphetamine cases). Table 3 shows the results of several OLS regression analyses corresponding to equation
(1) for crack cases from years 2009 to 2011. Specification (1) controls for only a linear monthly time trend and a post-FSA dummy. Specification (2) further controls for defendant characteristics including race, gender, drug quantity, and criminal history via dummy variables.
Recognizing that the FSA is essentially being imposed on judicial districts (as it is the combination of the judges and prosecutors in a district that essentially apply their interpretation of federal sentencing policy), and districts may differ not only in their general sentencing severity but also in their variance in sentencing policy, specification (3) further controls for district fixed-effects and uses two-way clustered standard errors by district and time (monthly).
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As can be seen, in all of the specifications (1) - (3) 5 Thanks to Colin Cameron for making his two-way clustered standard errors code available.
As discussed previously, one might think that the FSA had a larger impact on crack defendants with previous criminal histories, as prior to the FSA a large fraction of mandatory minimum eligible first-time crack offenders were able to avoid the mandatory minimums due to their eligibility for the federal "safety-valve" relief (USSC 2011). Given this, specification (5) puts in separate time trends and post-FSA indicator variables for first-time offenders (criminal history category 1) and repeat offenders (criminal history category 2+). As can be seen, while again the coefficients on both of the time trend variables are negative and statistically significant, the coefficients on the two post-FSA dummies provide very little evidence that sentencing trends changed for either of these two groups following the implementation of the FSA.
Given distribution of sentence lengths is actually quite right skewed, simply using raw sentence length as the outcome variable in the regression specifications might not be the best fitting specification. So, Table 4 shows the results of specifications identical to those in Table 3 , but using natural log of sentence length as the outcome variable. As can again be seen, the results are essentially the same as in Table 3 , again suggesting that sentencing trend for crack offenders did not change following the implementation of the FSA.
As discussed in Section III, another way to consider the direct impact of the changes to mandatory minimums dictated by the FSA is to examine whether sentences changed more in quantity categories directly impacted by the FSA relative to quantity categories not directly impacted by the FSA. To the extent to which raising the mandatory minimum quantity thresholds as dictated by the FSA was the primary driver of any changes in sentence lengths around the passage of the FSA, then we should see larger declines in sentence lengths among defendants convicted for crack quantities that were directly impacted by the FSA than defendants convicted for quantities not directly impacted by the FSA.
To look at this, Table 5 shows simple changes in mean sentence length for crack offenders in the time following the passage of the FSA relative to the time just prior to its passage across seven different quantity categories (to ensure ample number of cases in each cell, the pre-FSA period consists of the two years prior to the implementation of the FSA and the post-FSA consists of the two years following the implementation of the FSA). As alluded to above, the FSA itself only impacted defendants convicted for crack quantities between 0.005 kilograms to 0.028 kilograms (subject to a mandatory minimum before FSA but not after) and those convicted for crack quantities between 0.05 kilograms and 0.28 kilograms (subject to a lower mandatory minimum after the passage of the FSA than before). Any mandatory minimums associated with the other quantity categories were unaffected by the FSA. However, as also discussed above, the sentencing guidelines for all of the crack categories also changed just after the implementation of the FSA. Notably, though, by time the FSA was implemented in 2010 the guidelines were advisory rather than mandatory.
As can be seen in Table 5 , mean sentences fell significantly for all crack defendants other than those convicted for quantities less than 0.005 kilograms. Most notably, both in raw terms and percentage terms, the fall in average sentence length for those in FSA affected quantity categories were roughly in line with the fall in average sentence lengths of those in quantity categories that were not directly affected by the FSA. Again, these findings suggest that much of the changes in sentencing of crack offenders around the passage of the FSA were not necessarily due to the changes in the mandatory minimums as dictated by the FSA.
Overall, the analyses in this section suggest that the FSA per se does not appear to be wholly responsible for the recent declines in the mean sentence for crack defendants, as sentences for crack offenders convicted for quantities that were ostensibly not directly affected by the FSA changes to the mandatory minimums saw similar declines as those that were, and maybe even more notably, there was a downward trend in sentencing for crack offenders starting To look at this more formally, analogous to the regression specification (4) in Table 3 (2)), and specification (3) further controls for district fixed effects (i.e., D in equation (2)). Specification (3) also uses two-way clustered standard errors by district and time (monthly). The stars indicate the level of significance with respect to chi-squared test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the postYear j indicator equals the coefficient on the postYear j-1 indicator.
As can be seen in Table 6a , the coefficient on the postYear2008 indicator is negative and large in magnitude across all specifications, and a chi-squared test rejects the equality of the As a comparison, Table 6b shows regressions analogous to those in Table 6a , but using only the sample of powder cocaine defendants. As can be seen, there is little evidence of anything but a flat trend in sentencing of powder cocaine offenders throughout the whole time period from 2002-2012.
Overall, the results shown in Tables 6a and 6b 
VI. What Would Have Happened to Crack Sentences in the Absence of the FSA?
The results above show that the trend toward more leniency for crack offenders started well before the implementation of the FSA, and moreover, that the FSA did not appear to accelerate this trend. However, this does not mean that the FSA had no impact on sentencing.
Indeed, in the absence of the FSA, the mandatory minimums may have impeded the downward trend in sentencing for crack offenders from continuing. This section attempts look at this issue in more detail.
In thinking about what sentences for crack offenders would have been in the absence of the FSA we first have to consider whether the FSA impacted other aspects of the judicial process beyond just sentencing. Maybe most notably, did the changes inherent in the FSA cause defendants to alter how much crack they carried and/or prosecutor's willingness and ability to bargain over the conviction quantity? The dataset used here does not provide information on the initial quantity any given defendant was charged with, so these issues cannot be looked at directly. We can however look at how the distribution of conviction quantities for crack defendants changed before and after the FSA was implemented. Figure 5 indicate the quantity bins that would have been directly impacted by the FSA. Again, defendants convicted for quantities in these two bins would be subject to a shorter mandatory minimum post-FSA than pre-FSA, while defendants in all other bins would be subject to the same mandatory minimum pre-and post-FSA. Curiously, both in the years before and the years after the FSA, the two FSA impacted quantity ranges contain more than half of the cases (this will be something to return to later). Moreover, the fraction of cases in each of these two bins changes somewhat before and after the FSA was implemented. Notably however, these changes go in different directions across these two quantity bins. The fraction of crack defendants convicted for quantities between 0.005 kilograms and 0.028 kilograms falls in the two years following the implementation of the FSA, while the fraction convicted for quantities between 0.05 kilograms and 0.28 kilograms rises somewhat in the two years following the implementation of the FSA.
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These findings are a little ambiguous regarding whether defendants or prosecutors significantly changed their behaviors in response to the FSA. While the distribution of conviction quantities does seem to change slightly in the quantities that would ostensibly be affected by the FSA, it does not do so in a uniform manner. From a defendant's perspective, the consequences from being convicted for a quantity between 0.005 kilograms and 0.028 kilograms, or for a quantity between 0.05 kilograms and 0.28 kilograms, should be lower post-FSA. Similarly, post-FSA, judges and prosecutors should ostensibly have more discretion over the sentences given to defendants convicted for quantities between 0.005 kilograms and 0.028 kilograms, and between 0.05 kilograms and 0.28 kilograms, than they did before. Both of these forces would seem to suggest that we would see a significantly higher fraction of defendants in these two categories post-FSA than pre-FSA, but as stated above, we find that is only true in one of these categories, with exactly the opposite occurring in the other. In general, Figure 4 does not suggest large changes in criminal or prosecutor behavior with respect to real or charged crack quantities.
Another aspect of behavior that may have changed in response to the FSA is the willingness of prosecutors to invoke the federal "safety-valve" provision. As alluded to in Section II, defendants ostensibly eligible for a federal mandatory minimum can be given a sentence less than the mandatory minimum if they are deemed eligible for the federal "safetyvalve" program, which can occur if the prosecutor determines that the defendant has a minimal criminal history, there was no gun or violence used I the commission of the crime, the defendant was not a leader or organizer, and the defendant was determined to be cooperative. While some of these criteria are quite objective (e.g., minimal criminal history), most leave substantial discretion up to the prosecutor (e.g., the defendant was cooperative, the defendant was not an organizer or leader). Hence, one might wonder whether prosecutors became less likely to grant safety-valve eligibly after the FSA raised the quantity thresholds determining eligibility for the mandatory minimums for crack. Figure 5 shows that the rate at which the safety-valve was invoked for crack defendants was essentially unchanged surrounding the implementation of the FSA, hovering right around 12 percent. To look at this issue somewhat more rigorously, Table 7 shows the results of OLS linear probability models, where a binary variable equaling one if the safety-valve was reported to be invoked (and zero otherwise) was regressed on a post-FSA indicator variable, a monthly time trend, and other defendant characteristics. The results in specification (1) mirror the result shown in Figure 6 , showing that without conditioning on anything else, there is no significant time trend or change in the likelihood of the safety-valve being invoked post-FSA. Specification (2) further controls for race, gender, criminal history, and quantity, while specification (3) further adds district fixed-effects (and uses two-way clustered standard errors on district and monthly time).
As can be seen by the extremely small in magnitude coefficients on the post-FSA indicator (along with relatively tight confidence intervals), even controlling for defendant characteristics, there is no evidence that use of the safety-valve changed following the implementation of the FSA.
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Given the results above, let us consider again the extent to which the FSA prevented mandatory minimums from impeding the pre-FSA downward trends in sentencing for crack offenders from continuing. While determining a precise answer to this question may not be possible, we can potentially determine a reasonable bound. Specifically, let us suppose that pre-FSA, the mandatory minimums were already generally binding for defendants convicted for quantities between 0.005 and 0.028 kilograms and for defendants convicted for quantities between 0.05 and 0.28 kilograms (the two quantity categories directly impacted by the FSA). In other words, pre-FSA, prosecutors and judges generally wanted to give sentences to such defendants at or less than required by the mandatory minimum legislation but couldn't. Given this, in the absence of the FSA, even if prosecutors and judges wanted to continue the trend of becoming more lenient with respect to sentencing crack defendants, they would have been constrained to give sentences to defendants in these quantity categories similar to what they were giving to like defendants pre-FSA. Therefore, we can compute "counterfactual" sentences for However, recall from Figure 5 that almost 65 percent of crack defendants are convicted for quantities within one of these two quantity categories (both before and after the FSA).
Moreover, the above results likely overstate how much the downward trend in sentencing for crack offenders would have been impeded by mandatory minimums in the absence of the FSA, as it assumes that the mandatory minimums were already binding with respect to the sentencing of crack defendants in the affected quantity categories pre-FSA. This is likely a strong assumption. Regardless, these results are at least suggestive that even though the FSA didn't accelerate the downward trend in sentencing of crack offenders, without the FSA, this downward trend would have notably decelerated.
VII. The FSA and the Crack/Powder Cocaine Sentencing Gap
As alluded to previously, another of the main motivations for the FSA was to reduce the sentencing disparity between crack defendants and powder cocaine defendants, particularly for those convicted for similar amounts. This section examines this issue more directly.
The dark grey line with diamonds in Figure 7 shows the evolution of the crack/powder cocaine gap for sample to defendants convicted for quantities under 3 kilograms (which constitutes over 95 percent of crack cases). 
VIII. Conclusion
In contrast to some of the lofty rhetoric, the findings of this study suggest that the changes to the mandatory minimum sentence quantity thresholds for crack offenders as dictated by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) were actually quite modest in their impact. The FSA does not appear to be the primary force responsible for the fall in average crack cocaine sentences following the passage of the FSA, nor does it appear that the FSA in and of itself substantially decreased the sentencing disparity between crack cocaine defendants and powder cocaine defendants. Rather, it appears that changes the both the structure and implementation of the United States sentencing guidelines in the mid-2000s allowed prosecutors and/or judges to act on their preferences for more leniency with respect to sentencing drug defendants, particularly crack defendants. While the FSA itself does not appear to have substantially accelerated these trends toward greater leniency, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that it helped prevent the mandatory minimums from impeding the continuation of these trends.
Going forward, it is quite clear that to further reduce the crack/powder cocaine sentencing gap, the US Congress must work with the US Sentencing Commission to alter both the eligibility standards for mandatory minimums as well as the sentencing guidelines for crack. 
